Thursday, November 11, 2010

Science Finally Tackles Hypnosis

It seems hypnosis has been nearly everywhere over the past few centuries: onstage with entertainers swinging fat, gold watches; on couches with reclining psychoanalysis patients; in movies, books, and even children’s cartoons. But the one gig hypnosis couldn’t get was the scientific laboratory.

Until now.

The long-controversial practice of inducing a trancelike state through suggestion is getting a modern makeover by scientists armed with the latest neuroimaging tools and techniques. These researchers are beginning to offer evidence that, neurologically at least, hypnosis is entirely real.

“It makes sense that we are using modern tools of neuroscience research to understand what is a fascinating phenomenon,” said David Spiegel, a psychiatrist at Stanford University. “It’s good for hypnosis, and it’s good for neuroscience.”

The first report of hypnosis in practice dates back to the 18th century and an Austrian physician named Franz Mesmer, whose alleged otherworldly techniques for putting patients in trancelike states spawned the word “mesmerism.”

Almost from the beginning, the technique was controversial.

Skeptics have charged that the so-called phenomenon is nothing more than social role-playing, its use in medicine simply another form of the placebo effect. Its employment in psychotherapy has been challenged, particularly in light of claims that it can be used to implant false memories. And the idea, espoused by some hypnotists, that hypnosis involves an altered state of consciousness known as “trance,” has only made it seem more questionable.

Though experts quibble over the exact definition of hypnosis, they agree that it involves intense concentration, increased relaxation, and heightened suggestibility. In 2000, Spiegel and others conducted experiments involving perceptual and sensory experiences that demonstrated some of the effects hypnosis has on the brain.

Scientists still lack what would be the ultimate validation of this sort of research: a distinct neurological signature of hypnosis. It has been difficult to disentangle the effects of hypnotic suggestion from those of suggestion alone.

In Spiegel’s study, subjects—some hypnotized, others fully alert—viewed pictures in both color and grayscale. When hypnotized subjects were told they would see photos in color, the brain regions involved in the visual processing of color were activated, even if the subjects were actually viewing the grayscale photos. And when hypnotized subjects were told they would see photos in grayscale, the activation of the color processing regions decreased, regardless of which photos actually appeared.

Many studies have also shown that hypnotic suggestion can prompt changes in the brain’s pain processing centers. Such research has illustrated that when people are hypnotized before painful procedures, the areas of their brains that process pain are less active.

“When they use hypnosis to alter perception, the subjective experience is altered in measurable changes in just the right part of the brain,” Spiegel said. “When people say they are feeling less pain, they really are feeling less pain.”

“It’s providing objective evidence that hypnosis is real,” he continued.

But scientists still lack what would be the ultimate validation of this sort of research: a distinct neurological signature of hypnosis. So far, it has been difficult to disentangle the effects of hypnotic suggestion from those of suggestion alone. Researchers must also differentiate between the brain structures that play a role in hypnosis and those that are merely involved in the perceptual tasks subjects are asked to perform in these studies.

However, scientists are beginning to make some intriguing observations, particularly in the prefrontal cortex, the brain region responsible for the brain’s so-called executive functions: integrating the work of other brain structures, governing decision making, and, perhaps most relevantly, regulating attention. Researchers have long noted that hypnosis can be characterized as an extreme, narrowly focused form of attention.
Some researchers have found that areas in the prefrontal cortex—particularly the anterior cingulate cortex, which seems to be involved in attention, error detection, and resolving conflicts—change their activation patterns during hypnosis.

Scientists are hoping that, as more studies help pin down the brain structures involved in hypnosis, the phenomenon will become a more popular—and acceptable—focus of research, especially since the work could help illuminate other neurological phenomena.

“There’s two basic ways that neuroimaging is used in hypnosis research,” said Michael Nash, a psychologist at the University of Texas and the former editor of the International Journal of Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis. “One is to use neuroimaging to try to understand hypnosis. But the other way is to use hypnosis to produce in-the-laboratory experiences that can be studied through neuroimaging.”

For instance, hypnosis, which can prompt perceptual experiences similar to hallucination, may be a technique researchers can use to induce, and then study, hallucinations. Hypnosis might also be a tool for studying cognitive development—children are much more hypnotizable than adults—and for providing researchers with more information about attentional networks.

“As we do more and more research in laboratories, we can, in a sense, ‘domesticate’ hypnosis,” Nash said. “The neuroscience link adds a component to the credibility of hypnosis.”

So, too, might another modern science: genetics.

People vary widely in their ability to be hypnotized, but studies of identical and fraternal twins indicate that susceptibility to hypnosis may have a genetic component. Amir Raz, a psychiatrist at Columbia University, and his colleagues are now trying to pin down the specific genes that might be responsible for those variations. Researchers hope that finding a gene that modulates hypnosis—and the neurochemical pathway it affects—might finally silence skeptics.

“Part of the reason it hasn’t been explored before is because of the checkered reputation of hypnosis,” said Raz, who has published numerous neuroimaging studies of hypnosis. “Once you see people getting published in good and reputable journals with hypnosis studies, it’s going to prompt a whole wave of interest.”

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Margaret Mead's war theory kicks butt of neo-Darwinian and Malthusian models

Why war? Darwinian explanations, such as the popular "demonic males" theory of Harvard anthropologist Richard Wrangham, are clearly insufficient. They can't explain why war emerged relatively recently in human prehistory—less than 15,000 years ago, according to the archaeological record—or why since then it has erupted only in certain times and places.

Many scholars solve this problem by combining Darwin with gloomy old Thomas Malthus. "No matter where we happen to live on Earth, we eventually outstrip the environment," the Harvard archaeologist Steven LeBlanc asserts in Constant Battles: Why We Fight (Saint Martin's Griffin, 2004). "This has always led to competition as a means of survival, and warfare has been the inevitable consequence of our ecological-demographic propensities." Note the words "always" and "inevitable."

LeBlanc is as wrong as Wrangham. Analyses of more than 300 societies in the Human Relations Area Files, an ethnographic database at Yale University, have turned up no clear-cut correlations between warfare and chronic resource scarcity. Similarly, the anthropologist Lawrence Keeley notes in War before Civilization: The Myth of the Peaceful Savage (Oxford University Press, 1997) that the correlation between population pressure and warfare "is either very complex or very weak or both."

Two tribal societies—the Semai of Malaysia and the Waorani of the Ecuadorian Amazon—represent especially striking exceptions to the Malthusian model. According to the anthropologists Clayton and Carole Robarchek (pdf), who lived among both societies, the Semai population is 60 times denser than the Waorani, and they have much less food, because their soil less fertile and game less plentiful. And yet the Semai, the Robarcheks pointed out, "are among the most peaceful people" known to anthropology (even though some Semai helped British colonialists fight communist insurgents in the 1950s). The Waorani, however, are one of the most violent known societies, with casualties from warfare claiming as much as 60 percent of the population.

War is both underdetermined and overdetermined. That is, many conditions are sufficient for war to occur, but none are necessary. Some societies remain peaceful even when significant risk factors are present, such as high population density, resource scarcity, and economic and ethnic divisions between people. Conversely, other societies fight in the absence of these conditions. What theory can account for this complex pattern of social behavior?

The best answer I've found comes from Margaret Mead, who as I mentioned in a recent post is often disparaged by genophilic researchers such as Wrangham. Mead proposed her theory of war in her 1940 essay "Warfare Is Only an Invention—Not a Biological Necessity." She dismissed the notion that war is the inevitable consequence of our "basic, competitive, aggressive, warring human nature." This theory is contradicted, she noted, by the simple fact that not all societies wage war. War has never been observed among a Himalayan people called the Lepchas or among the Eskimos. In fact, neither of these groups, when questioned by early ethnographers, was even aware of the concept of war.

In discussing the Eskimos Mead distinguished between individual and group violence. Eskimos were "not a mild and meek people," she noted. They engaged in "fights, theft of wives, murder, cannibalism," often provoked by fear of starvation. "The personality necessary for war, the circumstances necessary to goad men to desperation are present, but there is no war."

Mead next addressed the claim that war springs from "the development of the state, the struggle for land and natural resources of class societies springing, not from the nature of man, but from the nature of history." Here Mead seems to invoke Marx as well as Malthus. Just as the biological theory is contradicted by simple societies that don't fight, Mead wrote, so the theory of "sociological inevitability" is contradicted by simple societies that do fight. Hunter–gatherers on the Andaman Islands "represent an exceedingly low level of society," but they have been observed waging wars, in which "tiny army met tiny army in open battle."

Australian aborigines, similarly, occasionally interrupted their wanderings "from water hole to water hole over their almost desert country" to battle each other. They seemed to fight not for any of the usual reasons—the "the struggle for lands, struggle for power of one group over another, expansion of population"—but because war was part of their tradition.

Warfare is "an invention," Mead concluded, like cooking, marriage, writing, burial of the dead or trial by jury. Once a society becomes exposed to the "idea" of war, it "will sometimes go to war" under certain circumstances. Some people, Mead stated, such as the Pueblo Indians, fight reluctantly to defend themselves against aggressors; others, such as the Plains Indians, sally forth with enthusiasm, because they have elevated martial skills to the highest of manly virtues; fighting bravely is the best way for a young man to achieve prestige and "win his sweetheart's smile of approval."

The original motivations for war's invention may have been those mentioned by Mead: conflicts between different groups over food, fertile land, women and status, perhaps driven by overpopulation. But the question remains why war spread so rapidly around the world after its initial invention. After all, unlike inventions such as cooking, agriculture and writing, which have obvious benefits, war is an extremely risky enterprise.

Mead did not directly address this question, but her successors have. The Robarcheks pointed out that war is in a sense "contagious," because when one group in a region resorts to war, "others must either take it up or be destroyed." Keeley, similarly, noted that war among North American Indians often stemmed from the aggression of just a few extremely warlike tribes, "rotten apples that spoiled their regional barrels." He added, "Less aggressive societies, stimulated by more warlike groups in their vicinity, become more bellicose themselves."

Societies in a violent region, the political scientist Azar Gat emphasized in War in Human Civilization (Oxford University Press, 2006[HARDCOVER]), have a strong incentive to carry out preemptive attacks. Societies may "attack the other side in order to eliminate or severely weaken them as a potential enemy. Indeed, this option only makes the other side more insecure, rendering the security dilemma more acute. War can thus become a self-fulfilling prophecy. The fear of war breeds war."

War, in other words, is a self-perpetuating meme. So how can we end it? Contrary to the claims of her critics, Mead was far from a naive optimist. In "Warfare Is Only an Invention" she asked, "If we know that it is not inevitable, that it is due to historical accident that warfare is one of the ways in which we think of behaving, are we given any hope by that?" Not necessarily, because "once an invention is known and accepted, men do not easily relinquish it." Writing at the dawn of World War II, Mead had good reason to fear that militarism had become too deeply embedded in modern culture to eradicate. "The deeds of our warriors are immortalized in the words of our poets; the toys of our children are modeled upon the weapons of war," she wrote.

For an invention to become obsolete, Mead argued, "people must recognize the defects of the old invention, and someone must make a new one." In this way trial by jury supplanted trial by ordeal or combat, which had come to seem "unfair, capricious, alien." She added that "to invent new forms of behavior which will make war obsolete, it is a first requirement to believe that such an invention is possible."

In the battle for ideas, scientists could learn from Christopher Hitchens

Science values data and statistics and champions the virtues of evidence and experimentation. Those of us “viewing the world with a rational eye” (as the new descriptor for this column reads) also have another, underutilized tool at our disposal: rapier logic like that of Christopher Hitchens, a practiced logician trained in rhetoric. Hitchens—who is “leaving the party a bit earlier than I’d like” because of esophagealcancer, as he lamented to Charlie Rose in a recent PBS interview—has something deeply important to offer on how to think about unscientific claims. Although he has no formal training in science, I would pit Hitchens against any of the purveyors of pseudoscientific clap trap because of his unique and enviable skill at peeling back the layers of an argument and cutting to its core.

We would all do well to observe and emulate his power to detect and dissect baloney through pure thought. To wit, after watching a quack medicine man fleecing India’s poor one Sunday afternoon, the belletrist scowled in a 2003 Slate column, “What can be asserted without evidence can also be dismissed without evidence.” The observation is worthy of elevation to a dictum.

Of course, as scientists we prefer to tether evidence, when it is available, to logical analysis in support of a claim or to proffer counterevidence that disputes a claim. A radiant example of Hitchens’s insightful thinking, coupled to the effective employment of counterevidence, is his reaction to an episode of the television series Planet Earth. As he watched, he had a revelation of creationism’s profound flaws. The episode was on life underground, during which Hitchens noticed that the blind salamander had “eyes” that “were denoted only by little concavities or indentations,” as he recounted in a 2008 Slate commentary. “Even as I was grasping the implications of this, the fine voice of Sir David Attenborough was telling me how many millions of years it had taken for these denizens of the underworld to lose the eyes they had once possessed.”

Creationists make a big deal about the eye, insisting that the gradual stepwise process of natural selection could not have sculpted such a complex instrument because of “irreducible complexity,” meaning that the removal of any part would render it useless. Even Charles Darwin fretted about the eye in On the Origin of Species: “To suppose that the eye, with all its inimitable contrivances for adjusting the focus to different distances, for admitting different amounts of light, and for the correction of spherical and chromatic aberration, could have been formed by natural selection, seems, I freely confess, absurd in the highest possible degree.”

If God created the eye, then how do creationists explain the blind salamander? “The most they can do is to intone that ‘the Lord giveth and the Lord taketh away,’” Hitchens mused. “Whereas the likelihood that the postocular blind ness of underground salamanders is another aspect of evolution by natural selection seems, when you think about it at all, so overwhelmingly probable as to con stitute a near certainty.” To confirm his instincts, Hitchens queried evolutionary biologist Richard Dawkins, who agreed: “Why on earth would God create a salamander with vestiges of eyes? If he wanted to create blind salamanders, why not just create blind salamanders? Why give them dummy eyes that don’t work and that look as though they were inherited from sighted ancestors?”

Hitchens’s point is even deeper, however, when he applies the counterfactual argument of regression to the cosmos itself, noting that “there is a dialectical usefulness to considering the conventional arguments in reverse, as it were. For example, to the old theistic question, ‘Why is there something rather than nothing?’ we can now counterpose the findings of Professor Lawrence Krauss and others, about the foreseeable heat death of the universe.... So, the question can and must be rephrased: ‘Why will our brief ‘something’ so soon be replaced with nothing?’ It’s only once we shake our own innate belief in linear progression and consider the many recessions we have undergone and will undergo that we can grasp the gross stupidity of those who repose their faith in divine providence and godly design.”

The dialectical usefulness of clear logic, coupled to elegant prose (layered on top of the usual dollop of data), cannot be overstated and should be considered by scientists as another instrument of persuasion in the battle for ideas. 

Wednesday, November 10, 2010

I ’M nobody! Who are you?
Are you nobody, too?
Then there ’s a pair of us—don’t tell!
They ’d banish us, you know.

How dreary to be somebody!
How public, like a frog
To tell your name the livelong day
To an admiring bog!

---- Emily Dickinson

Sunday, November 7, 2010

The Scales Of 70

If the totalled positive growth rates exceed ( "outweigh") the totalled negative growth rates by 70 then the population under consideration will double. If the totalled negative growth rates exceed ("outweigh") the totalled positive growth rates by 70 then the population under consideration will halve.

Friday, November 5, 2010

The Magnetic Sense of Animals

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The introductory figure summarizes our model for a photoreceptor-based magnetic compass in birds. The geomagnetic field can affect radical-pair reaction yields as governed by the stochastic Liouville equation depicted in the thinking bubble of the bird. These effects result in a modulation of visual information as shown in the right figure. The changes of visual modulation patterns with different orientations of the bird can explain the magnetic compass orientation observed in behavioral experiments.

Introduction

A large variety of animals possess a magnetic sense. Migratory birds use magnetic clues (in addition to light polarization, star signs, position of the sun) to find their way south in fall and north in spring. Salamanders, frogs, use the magnetic field for orientation when they have to find the direction of the nearest shore quickly, e.g., when they sense danger.

Behavioral experimentalists have used these natural movement patterns to design experiments that allow them to investigate in which way geomagnetic information is used for orientation. For example, during migratory unrest (Zugunruhe), birds are so eager to migrate that they will assemble even in cages in the direction they want to migrate to, e.g., south in fall. If the magnetic field is changed, so that magnetic south appears in a different direction, birds will assemble in this new direction. This behavioral assay was used in 1966 by Wolfgang Wiltschko of the University of Frankfurt, Germany to demonstrate for the first time that migratory birds indeed use magnetic clues.

Although the use of the geomagnetic field for directional information is well established experimentally, it is not known by which biophysical mechanism magnetoreception is achieved. The magnetic sense is maybe the last perception mechanism for which the nature of the receptors and of the biophysical mechanism remain unknown.

How can the geomagnetic field be perceived?

In understanding the mechanism of magnetoreception, one is immediately faced with the puzzle that the geomagnetic field is very weak (ca. 0.5 Gauss). Any suggestion for a magnetoreceptor mechanism needs to address the question whether a field as weak as the geomagnetic field can be detected by the proposed mechanism under conditions as they can be found in animals. If one thinks about how magnetic fields can be perceived in principle, three mechanisms immediately come to mind:

  • Mechanical Reception - This is the principle behind a compass needle. A magnetic field exerts a torque on a ferromagnetic material or on a material with diamagnetic anisotropy. Only ferromagnets will be able to produce a response to a field as weak as 0.5 Gauss that is detectable against thermal motion. In animals, the use of small magnetic particles (e.g., magnetite) as magnetoreceptors has been suggested. The use of magnetite has been shown in magnetotactic bacteria that are rotated by a magnetic field because of the torque exerted on their magnetite particles.
  • Electric Induction - Movement in a magnetic field will result in an induced electric field. Elasmobranch fish have a special sensory organ to perceive electric fields with high accuracy and can use this organ also to detect magnetic fields. However, such an organ can not be found in all animals capable of magnetoreception.
  • Chemical Reception - Chemical reactions that involve transitions between different spin states can be influenced by magnetic fields, so that one of the possible products is favored due to the influence of the magnetic field. Usually, magnetic fields much stronger than the geomagnetic field are necessary to see a significant change in products. For a particular type of chemical reaction, radical-pair reactions, it has recently been shown experimentally that 0.5 Gauss magnetic fields produce a small, but measurable change in product ratios.

There are several reasons that support a chemical compass mechanism working in birds (and other higher animals, such as salamanders) rather than the other two suggestions.

  1. The magnetic compass in birds measures the axis but not the polarity of the magnetic field lines. In other words: the compass in birds only detects the north-south axis, but not where north and south are. Such behavior is puzzling if the receptor is indeed consisting of small magnetic particles which should provide information about the directions of north and south. There is one plausible model by Dan Edmonds in Oxford, that attempts to explain the observed response on the basis of magnetic particles as receptors.
  2. The magnetic compass is light-dependent. The magnetic compass in birds requires the presence of short wavelength (blue/green) light in order to work properly. If only red light is present, birds are no longer able to orient. Such behavior points to the involvement of photoreceptors rather than magnets in magnetoreception.

A Model for a Vision-Based Chemical Compass

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We propose a magnetosensory organ that consists of a system of radical pairs that are orientationally ordered in the eye. We propose that a photoreceptor is part of the radical-pair system and that its sensitivity is modulated through the magnetic field effects on the radical-pair system. If one assumes an anisotropic hyperfine coupling, one can calculate in a simple radical-pair model how the response of the photoreceptor is changed depending on the angle of the magnetic field lines with the radical-pair system. Assuming that the radical-pair/photoreceptor system is distributed equally over the whole eye, one can evaluate how vision of a bird is modulated. The cartoons on top of the page illustrates how a bird converts an unprocessed image to an image which provides directional information through a radical-pair system obeying the stochastic Liouville equation. To the left, the visual modulation patterns are shown for a bird flying parallel to the horizon (geomagnetic field lines at an angle of 68 degrees with the horizon) and looking towards N,NE,E,SE,S,SW,W, and NW. The patterns are projected into the plane.


Investigators


Publications

A model for photoreceptor-based magnetoreception in birds. Thorsten Ritz, Salih Adem, and Klaus Schulten. Biophysical Journal, 78:707-718, 2000.

A biomagnetic sensory mechanism based on magnetic field modulated coherent electron spin motion. Klaus Schulten, Charles E. Swenberg, and Albert Weller. Zeitschrift für Physikalische Chemie, NF111:1-5, 1978.

Magnetic field effects in chemistry and biology. Klaus Schulten. In J. Treusch, editor, Festkörperprobleme, volume 22, pp. 61-83. Vieweg, Braunschweig, 1982.

Disrupting Magnetic Compass Orientation with Radio Frequency Oscillating Fields. Thorsten Ritz. In Proceedings of RIN01: Orientation & Navigation - Birds, Humans & other Animals. Royal Institute of Navigation, Oxford (2001).


More Interesting People and Pages

  • Wolfgang and Roswitha Wiltschko [in German] - Their lab pioneered and still leads behavioral studies with migratory birds.
  • John Phillips - In his lab many excellent behavioral assays for different animals have been developed
  • Joseph Kirschvink - Pursues the hypothesis of magnetite particles as magnetoreceptors in different animals
  • Ken Lohmann - Behavioral and neurophysiological studies of sea turtles and other marine animals
  • Christiane Timmel - Studies the effects of weak static and oscillatory magnetic fields in biological contexts
  • Peter Hore - Theoretical chemist, studying in particular effects of weak magnetic fields on chemical reactions

"Christmas in the New Rome," 1862

The day shall dawn when never child but may
Go forth upon the sward secure to play.
No cruel wolves shall trespass in their nooks,
Their lore of lions shall come from picture-books.
No aging tree a falling branch shall shed
To strike an unsuspecting infant's head.
From forests shall be tidy copses born
And every desert shall become a lawn.
Lisping their stories with competing zest,
One shall declare, "I come from out the West,
Where Grandpa toiled the fearful sea to take
And pen it tamely to a harmless lake!"
Another shall reply, "My home's the East,
Where, Mama says, dwelt once a savage beast
Whose fangs he oft would bare in horrid rage-
Indeed, I've seen one, safely in a cage!"
Likewise the North, where once was only snow,
The rule of halls and cottages shall know,
The lovely music of a baby's laugh,
The road, the railway and the telegraph,
And eke the South; the oceans round the Pole
Shall be domestic. What a noble goal!
Such dreams unfailingly the brain inspire
And to exploring Englishmen do fire…